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BIOPOLITICAL AND NECROPOLITICAL CONSTRUC-
TIONS OF THE INCARCERATED TRANS BODY
CHRISTOPH M. ZHANG*
To incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means to provide for their 
own needs. Prisoners are dependent on the State for food, clothing, and 
necessary medical care. A prison’s failure to provide sustenance for in-
mates may actually produce physical torture or a lingering death. Just as 
a prisoner may starve if not fed, he or she may suffer or die if not provided 
adequate medical care. A prison that deprives prisoners of basic suste-
nance, including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept 
of human dignity and has no place in civilized society. 
Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011). 
introdUCtion
Michelle Lynne Kosilek is a sixty-eight-year-old White trans1 woman currently in-
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1  Trans people are people whose gender identity differs from the sex assigned to them at birth. 
Throughout this Article, I use the term trans to describe all those who self-identify in some capacity as 
transgender, transsexual, gender-variant, gender non-conforming, non-binary, or genderqueer, as well as to 
designate communities. The term transgender has gained traction as an umbrella term with increasing legal 
and medical recognition of trans identity and experience; thus, I use transgender specifically with reference 
to the ways in which (some) trans people have received such recognition in law, policy, media, medicine, 
and other areas of the political sphere. The term transsexual originated in medical literature that considered 
trans identity pathological, and has since fallen out of respectful use. Nevertheless, older generations of trans 
people used and continue to use the term transsexual to describe themselves. Birth-assigned sex is the sex 
listed on one’s birth certificate, generally based on a physician’s or nurse’s visual designation of an infant’s 
external genitalia as “male” or “female.” Although courts and journalists liberally use “biological sex” to 
refer to birth-assigned sex, the two concepts are distinct. Biological sex in human beings is a construct 
based on chromosomal sex, gonads, hormone levels, and the anatomy of internal and external genitalia. Not 
all of these components align with traditional conceptions of male or female in every individual; thus, an 
individual’s biological sex cannot in fact be known based on genitalia alone.
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carcerated in the general population of Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk 
(MCI-Norfolk), a medium security men’s prison managed by the Massachusetts Depart-
ment of Corrections (DOC). Since 1992, Kosilek has been serving a life sentence without 
the possibility of parole.2 From the very beginning of her incarceration, Kosilek has re-
lentlessly sought access to gender-affirming care. In 1992, she filed a pro se lawsuit in the 
District Court of Massachusetts pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the DOC, seeking 
damages and injunctive relief, and arguing that their refusal to provide her treatment for 
gender identity disorder violated her Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care.3 
Under the standard established in Estelle v. Gamble,4 a plaintiff must affirmatively show 
(a) a serious medical need and (b) “deliberate indifference” on the part of the defendants. 
Kosilek’s medical need was demonstrated by the diagnosis of gender identity disorder 
(GID; now called gender dysphoria). The second prong, the deliberate indifference stan-
dard, proved much harder to meet. Nevertheless, the DOC rescinded the “freeze-frame” 
policy that it had adopted in response to litigation, a policy that categorically barred trans 
prisoners from receiving any gender-affirming care they had not been prescribed prior to 
incarceration. Kosilek eventually gained access to hormone therapy and electrolysis. The 
battle continued, however, over access to gender-affirming genital surgery, or “sex reas-
signment surgery” (SRS) as it was called by the courts and the parties in this case. 
Access to gender-affirming care of one’s choice is crucial to the self-determination of 
trans people. Gender-affirming care refers to any regimen or procedure administered by 
the medical establishment that trans people may elect to receive, with the aim of modifying 
their bodies to match their internal sense of gender. The notion of “care” captures only 
a subset of gender-affirming somatechnics, or technologies of body modification. Many 
trans people may not view transness as essentially medical, but certain somatechnics are 
only available through a process of medical consultation and diagnosis by a licensed ex-
pert. Not all trans people seek gender-affirming care, and many who do cannot access it. 
The restrictions on somatechnics are governed both by the field of medicine (in defining 
health, illness, and care) and by legislation (licensing health care professionals who may 
legally prescribe or operate on patients). 
In using the term “care” throughout, this Article is also implicated in the transmedi-
calist framework that currently structures access to gender-affirming somatechnics. Trans-
medicalism refers to the understanding of transness as an essentially medical condition. 
2  Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek IV), 774 F.3d 63, 68–69 (1st Cir. 2014).
3  Id. at 69. 
4  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
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A critical implication of transmedicalism is the supposition that experiencing gender dys-
phoria is necessarily a part of being trans, which is inconsistent with the lived experiences 
of many trans people. A diagnosis of gender dysphoria (GD) requires “clinically signif-
icant distress” or “impairment in the functions of daily life,”5 and such a diagnosis is a 
pre-requisite to receiving most forms of gender-affirming care. Although being trans is 
not a medical condition, transmedicalism structures access to gender-affirming substances 
and procedures. This has made it possible and necessary for trans prisoners to parse their 
needs into existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence through Estelle, which established 
that “deliberate indifference to serious medical need” falls into the category of “cruel and 
unusual punishments.”6 
Kosilek is one of many trans people7 who have sought access to gender-affirming care 
behind bars. Asserting their rights under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments,8 trans plaintiffs built a rich repertoire of legal strategies to frame their needs in the 
vocabulary of a Constitution whose writers did not contemplate their existence. This Ar-
ticle will focus its discussion on claims under the Eighth Amendment that prison officials 
have improperly withheld gender-affirming care. Due to the relative scarcity of such cases 
and the absence of Supreme Court guidance, all circuits cite one another; therefore, this 
Article will discuss them together. Despite a smattering of victories that have significant-
ly expanded trans prisoners’ access to hormone replacement therapy (HRT), courts and 
the public at large have been far less willing to accept essentially identical arguments for 
access to gender-affirming genital surgery. This was also evident throughout the Kosilek 
litigation, which ultimately spanned two decades. It produced what is likely the most com-
prehensive judicial treatment of a transgender prisoner to date in the form of four lengthy 
5  ameriCan psYChiatriC assoCiation, Gender dYsphoria (2013), https://www.psychiatry.org/File%20
Library/Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA_DSM-5-Gender-Dysphoria.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VYW-4KBD].
6  Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
7  There is relatively little literature on trans men in women’s prisons, but many writers note that often 
women’s prisons punish gender non-conformity especially severely. See Lori Girshick, Out of Compliance: 
Masculine-Identified People in Women’s Prisons, in Captive Genders: trans embodiment and the prison 
industrial Complex 215 (Eric A. Stanley & Nat Smith eds., 2015); Sarah Pemberton, Enforcing Gender: The 
Constitution of Sex and Gender in Prison Regimes, 39 siGns 151, 167 (2013).
8  See, e.g., Brown v. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 2016 WL 6637937, at *2 (D. Neb. Nov. 9, 
2016) (“Plaintiff seeks to assert claims for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief for violations of the 
First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments that occurred when the defendants subjected Plaintiff to 
gender discrimination, cruel and unusual punishment, violation of Plaintiff’s right to equal protection, and 
defamation of character related to her ‘constitutional rights to free gender expression.’”).
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opinions between the Massachusetts District Court and the First Circuit Court of Appeals.9 
The opinions reveal a judicial struggle to resolve what is uncritically portrayed as the con-
flict between a transgender woman’s medical needs and the discretionary security interests 
of prison management. This has resulted in an impasse10 over what constitutes deliberate 
indifference that has, perhaps, obscured the meaning of “care” in the Eighth Amendment 
context. 
This Article posits that the issue of gender-affirming genital surgery conjures compet-
ing constructions of the incarcerated trans body that reflect different conceptions of its re-
lationship to state power. It offers a reading of this conflict as a clash between a biopolitical 
and a necropolitical conception of the incarcerated trans body. Biopolitics is a theory of 
state power that views the state as the arbiter and administrator of life and all life processes. 
Necropolitics, on the other hand, posits that sovereignty is defined by its power to mark out 
certain populations for social and literal death. 
Part I explicates the concepts of biopolitics and necropolitics, drawing on the work 
of Michel Foucault and Achille Mbembé. In the biopolitical framework, the trans body is 
constructed as an object of medico-legal in(ter)vention. It is created when the subject is 
validated as transgender through medical diagnosis of gender dysphoria, which implies 
the need for health care. In the necropolitical framework, the trans body interrupts the re-
gime of carceral subjugation, one aspect of which is gendered discipline, enforced in part 
through strict sex segregation. The trans body is inscribed with violence. It is imagined 
both as essentially inviting violence (in a men’s prison) or as threatening it (in a women’s 
prison). 
Part II provides an overview of the Eighth Amendment cases brought by trans plain-
tiffs. It begins by reviewing the cases that develop the “deliberate indifference to serious 
medical need” test in the context of denial of gender-affirming care to trans prisoners. Fol-
lowing this background, Part II introduces the Kosilek case and narrates its lengthy history. 
9  Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014). “[Kosilek] litigation has spanned more than twenty years and 
produced several opinions of significant length.” Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 68 (citation omitted); Kosilek v. 
Spencer (Kosilek III), 740 F.3d 733, 736 (1st Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc; Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II), 889 F. 
Supp. 2d 190 (D. Mass. 2012); Kosilek v. Maloney (Kosilek I), 221 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Mass. 2002).
10  Although the defendants ultimately prevailed in the Kosilek case, the judges who presided over the case 
were closely divided. District Judge Wolf found for the defendants in Kosilek I and for the plaintiff in Kosilek 
II. On appeal in the First Circuit, a three-judge panel found 2–1 for the plaintiff before being reversed 3–2 on 
rehearing en banc.
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Part III undertakes a close reading of the Kosilek case, attending to the biopolitical and 
necropolitical logics that are mobilized by the parties and reflected in the court opinions. 
Finally, Part IV will consider how courts and advocates might respond given the im-
passe between these two competing visions. I argue that for courts, ceding to the necropo-
litical logic presented by prison management in these cases abdicates their responsibility to 
protect prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights. 
I. Biopolitical and Necropolitical Trans Bodies
This Part lays out the theoretical groundwork for the ensuing discussion of how courts 
(re)construct the body of the incarcerated trans person in these decisions, especially Ko-
silek. Beginning with Foucault’s concept of discipline, in the first section I discuss the 
implications of the sex segregation of the prison space for incarcerated trans people. In the 
second and third sections, I outline the theories of biopolitics and necropolitics respectively 
and discuss how each theory produces a way of viewing the incarcerated trans subject.
A. Gender Discipline, Sex Segregation
Michel Foucault theorized that modern state power acts on subjects through discipline. 
Discipline molds “docile” bodies by organizing space, time, and everyday activities in 
institutions such as schools, hospitals, and prisons.11 Subsequent scholars including Sarah 
Pemberton have extrapolated a gendered dimension from this account. Pemberton argues 
that gendered bodies and identities come into being through gendered disciplinary power.12 
Within institutions and in everyday interactions, “individuals are assessed against gendered 
norms of appearance and behavior until they become self-disciplined gendered subjects 
who impose these norms on themselves.”13 The imposition of gendered norms begins with 
sex assignment at birth and persists through legal and administrative identification of an 
individual as a legally gendered subject. The United States is unique in that there is no sin-
gular, unified gender-administering regime. Instead, legal gender is a composite of a multi-
tude of federal, state, and local agencies that administer gender classification independent 
11  miChel FouCault, disCipline and punish 138 (Alan Sheridan trans., 2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter FouCault, 
disCipline & punish].
12  Pemberton, supra note 7, at 152. 
13  Id. at 157.
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of one another.14 An individual seeking to change their legal gender must apply separately 
at each agency for a change of gender marker on the documents published by that agency 
or in the database it maintains. The only possible options, with few recent exceptions,15 are 
“male” and “female” or “M” and “F.” Dean Spade, who has undertaken a study of the di-
verse requirements for gender reclassification, writes: “Every government agency and pro-
gram that tracks gender has its own rule or practice (sometimes dependent on a particular 
clerk’s opinion) of what evidence should be shown to warrant an official change in gender 
status in its records or on its ID.”16 The vast majority of agencies only permit a change of 
gender marker with medical documentation; many require the completion of SRS, though 
an increasing number are changing to the more liberal standard of a doctor’s note indicat-
ing the presence of gender dysphoria.17 The diversity of requirements for legal, administra-
tive, and institutional gender reclassification illustrate that the boundary between genders 
is not equally permeable in all contexts.
 
Foucault used the term carceral to describe the power-knowledge regime that under-
girds mass incarceration.18 The carceral system is “the disciplinary form at its most ex-
treme, the model in which are concentrated all the coercive technologies of behaviour.”19 
The influence of the carceral extends beyond the prison space due to the “continuity of 
institutions”: carceral discipline diffuses into hospitals, schools, the military, and shapes 
social norms.20 In contemporary America, this is captured in the term prison industrial 
14  dean spade, normal liFe: administrative violenCe, CritiCal trans politiCs, & the limits oF law 79 
(2015) [hereinafter spade, normal liFe]; Pemberton, supra note 7, at 160; Tey Meadow, A Rose is a Rose: 
On Producing Legal Gender Classifications, 24 Gender & soC’Y 814, 815 (2010); Dean Spade, Documenting 
Gender, 59 hastinGs l.J. 731, 759 (2008).
15  Since 2017, some states, including Oregon, Washington, New York, California, and the District of 
Columbia, have begun to recognize a nonbinary gender option on various legal documents, including birth 
certificates. See Annie Tritt, States are starting to recognize a third gender. Here’s what that means for 
nonbinary youth, vox (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/3/28/17100252/trans-nonbinary-
third-gender-youth-legal-recognition [https://perma.cc/F5B5-WNC5].
16  spade, normal liFe, supra note 14, at 79.
17  Id.
18  Michael Rembis, The New Asylums: Madness and Mass Incarceration in the Neoliberal Era, in 
disabilitY inCarCerated: imprisonment and disabilitY in the united states and Canada 139, 140 (Liat Ben-
Moshe, Chris Chapman, & Allison C. Carey eds., 2014).
19  FouCault, disCipline & punish, supra note 11, at 293.
20  Id. at 299.
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complex.21 At the heart of the carceral system remain the most violent, coercive, “dis-
ciplinary” technologies that dominate, subjugate, and control bodies. Carceral discipline 
acts directly on the bodies of the incarcerated, for example, through techniques of spatial 
compartmentalization: enclosure, partitioning, solitary confinement, sex segregation, and 
so on.22 Additionally, carceral discipline marks prisoners out for social death and renders 
them unable to fully reintegrate into society even if released.23 
Carceral discipline has a gendered dimension. Prisons are sites of legal sex segrega-
tion and among the most restrictive of gender reclassification regimes.24 On a basic level, 
placement is based on visual inspection of an individual’s genitals at intake, or else one’s 
assigned sex at birth.25 Non-normative bodies or genitals disrupt the dehumanizing process 
of “sexing” prisoners, which often provokes invasive and violent responses by prison staff 
tasked with placement.26 Gendered discipline is harshly enforced in both men’s and wom-
en’s prisons. In men’s prisons, Pemberton argues, sex segregation and carceral discipline 
produce a norm of violent hypermasculinity.27 Individuals who do not conform to this 
norm, such as transfeminine people, are especially vulnerable to violence. Trans bodies 
threaten the stability of these preexisting, highly coercive gender norms by posing a chal-
lenge to the discourses and techniques of gendered discipline––namely, the assumptions 
of sex segregation. 
B. Medical Biopower: Producing the Incarcerated Transfeminine Body
Biopolitics is a theory of sovereignty developed by Michel Foucault, which posits 
that modern state power is defined by its functions of fostering and administering life. In 
21  Captive Genders: trans embodiment and the prison industrial Complex 12 (Eric A. Stanley & Nat 
Smith eds., 2015). 
22  FouCault, disCipline & punish, supra note 11, at 141–43.
23  Id. at 267, 301 (“The conditions to which the free inmates are subjected necessarily condemn them to 
recidivism . . . . Although . . . prison punishes delinquency, delinquency is for the most part produced in and 
by an incarceration which, ultimately, prison perpetuates in its turn.”).
24  Pemberton, supra note 7, at 160.
25  Id. at 162 (“While Dean Spade argues that most prison authorities in the United States employ 
recognition policies based on birth sex, most scholars state that prisons usually classify and place inmates 
according to their genitalia.”) (citing Spade, Documenting Gender, supra note 14, at 735).
26  Id. at 153.
27  Id. at 167–69.
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Foucault’s genealogical account, the onset of liberal modernity is marked by the prolifera-
tion of technologies of governance aimed at “the subjugation of bodies and the control of 
populations.”28 These biopolitical technologies displace premodern technologies of execu-
tion and exile as the defining activity of the state, and state power becomes biopower: the 
power to regulate all life processes.29 Biopower produces and optimizes disciplined bodies, 
generates norms of health, and reproduces the life of the population.30 It operates on both 
the level of individual bodies and on the population as a whole. 
Extrapolating from Foucault’s account, Dean Spade writes that technologies of pop-
ulation management include “taxation, military conscription, social welfare programs . 
. . immigration policy and enforcement, criminal punishment systems, the Census, and 
identity documentation programs,” all of which use “purportedly neutral criteria aimed 
at distributing health and security and ensuring order” and “produce clear ideas about the 
characteristics of the national population.” In the United States, according to Spade, bio-
power operates through administrative systems that 
have emerged out of and been focused on [the] creation and manage-
ment of racial and gender categories to establish the nation itself through 
gendered-racialized property regimes. Racializing and gendering are na-
tion-making activities carried out through the creation of population-level 
interventions, including administrative systems and norms, that preserve 
and cultivate the lives of some and expose other to premature death.31 
In other words, biopower does not foster any and all life equally, but rather “distributes life 
chances across populations.”32
28  miChel FouCault, the historY oF sexualitY, vol. I 140 (1990) [hereinafter FouCault, historY oF 
sexualitY].
29  The reference to state power should not imply the concentration of power in a unitary sovereign. 
In the contemporary United States, power is decentralized and dispersed across a multiplicity of legal, 
administrative, and institutional regimes, which generate and reify “practices and knowledge that coalesce 
in conditions and arrangements that affect everyone and that make certain populations highly vulnerable to 
imprisonment.” spade, normal liFe, supra note 14, at 3.
30  FouCault, historY oF sexualitY, supra note 28, at 139.
31  spade, normal liFe, supra note 14, at 78.
32  Id. at 75.
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Gender is both produced and regulated by discourses and techniques of biopower.33 
In Foucault’s account, “bodies are never natural or outside power but are shaped by and 
interpreted through discourses and techniques of power.”34 Paul Preciado has theorized 
gender as the sum of diverse technologies that “modify the body or . . . produce subjectivity 
intentionally in order to conform to a preexisting visual and biopolitical order, which [is] 
prescriptive for what [is] supposed to be a female or male human body.”35 Examples in-
clude gendered socialization and disciplinary norms, body modification, as well as classi-
fication and legitimation by legal and administrative institutions. These technologies work 
in tandem to create gendered bodies, which are viewed (or “read”) through an interpretive 
lens that reinscribes gender norms upon them.36 
The term somatechnics is used to refer to the subject’s conscious modifications of 
their own bodily features, capacities, or appearance.37 Somatechnics range from everyday 
practices (such as grooming, exercise, diet) to expressive body modifications (piercings, 
tattoos, cosmetic surgery, breast enhancement), to medical procedures and treatments (hor-
mones, Viagra, contraceptives, chest surgery, genital surgery). Somatechnics, including 
medical somatechnics, are employed by both gender-normative and gender-variant peo-
ple to affirm their gender.38 The use of gender-affirming somatechnics is partly effected 
through self-discipline. However, medical somatechnics are not equally accessible to all 
people. As Dean Spade points out, “Medicaid provides all of the gender-confirming proce-
dures and medications that trans people request to nontrans people and only denies them to 
those seeking them based on a transgender diagnostic profile.”39 In 2016, there was a brief 
33  See, e.g., Pemberton, supra note 7, at 152, 157.
34  Id. at 157.
35  paul b. preCiado, testo Junkie: sex, druGs, and biopolitiCs in the pharmaCopornoGraphiC era 100 
(2013). 
36  See Pemberton, supra note 7, at 157. 
37  preCiado, supra note 35, at 78.
38  Pemberton, supra note 7, at 158–59.
39  spade, normal liFe, supra note 14, at 82 (“For example, testosterones and estrogens are frequently 
prescribed to nontransgender people for a variety of conditions including hypogonadism, menopause, late 
onset of puberty, vulvular atrophy, atrophic vaginitis, ovary problems . . . intersex conditions, breast cancer or 
prostate cancer, and osteoporosis prevention. Similarly, the chest surgery that transgender men often seek––
removing breast tissue to create a flat chest––is regularly provided and paid for by Medicaid for nontrans 
men who develop . . . gynecomastia, where breast tissue grows in what are considered abnormal amounts. 
Nontransgender women who are diagnosed with hirsutism––where facial or body hair grows in what are 
considered abnormal amounts––are frequently treated for this condition through Medicaid coverage. In 
Columbia Journal of Gender and law266 37.2
period of hope that this discrimination would be corrected when the Department of Health 
and Human Services issued a rule implementing Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act, 
prohibiting discrimination by health programs receiving federal financial assistance on the 
basis of sex. The rule incorporated the Title IX prohibition of sex discrimination and in-
terpreted it to include discrimination on the basis of gender identity, which meant that a 
procedure available for any other diagnosis must also be available for gender dysphoria. 
Unfortunately, the regulations met with conservative backlash and were enjoined in Fran-
ciscan Alliance v. Burwell.40
Consequently, one way the biopolitical state regulates gender is by producing a med-
icalized transgender identity through a medico-legal apparatus that limits and regulates 
access to certain gender-affirming somatechnics. Transmedicalism, understood as a regime 
of restrictions on access, is a conduit for the biopolitical regulation of gender. Trans people 
inhabit and desire a diverse variety of bodies, but state recognition of transgender bodies 
is conditioned on their prescription and reinscription of the very same gender norms by 
only permitting access to a particular combination of gender-affirming somatechnics for 
individuals of each gender. In this way, the state is able to take stock of trans subjects and 
fold them into the liberal polity without unravelling the legal apparatus of producing and 
enforcing the gender binary.
The biopolitical power that creates transgender subjects as patients and transgender 
bodies as objects of medical intervention continues to exist behind bars. However, it dif-
fers from that in the free world in at least two respects. In prison, power acts from above 
with its source in a concentrated sovereign, whereas in the free world, power is diffused by 
market forces. Carceral biopower is totalitarian; trans prisoners like Kosilek cannot shop 
around for a doctor who will prescribe their preferred treatment. Secondly, as discussed in 
the previous section, prisons enforce gendered discipline with particular severity through 
sex segregation, and consequently men’s prisons are sites of hypermasculinity and (often 
sexual) violence. The strict enforcement of sex segregation creates an anxiety centered on 
the genitals, which is a metonym for the sex of a body. The regime of sex segregation per-
ceives the imagined appearance of genitals that do not conform to the norm of the (sexed) 
space as a disciplinary threat.
addition, reconstruction of breasts, testicles, penises, or other tissues lost to illness or accident is routinely 
performed or covered.”).
40  Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
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As Pemberton argues, men’s prisons and women’s prisons each enforce exaggerated 
disciplinary gender norms. Laurel Westbrook and Kristen Schilt have shown that men’s 
and women’s spaces are not policed equally, and that access to women’s spaces is policed 
with particularly heightened anxiety.41 Westbrook and Schilt locate the source of this anx-
iety in “fears of unwanted (hetero)sexuality,” resulting in an overwhelming fixation on 
genitalia. Anxiety is particularly fixated on penises and their potential to intrude/protrude 
into female spaces, where they signify sexual threats.42 Consequently, the possibility of 
housing a trans woman in a women’s prison is unthinkable if she has a penis. As sexual vi-
olence is naturalized in the carceral space, penises––which are “associated with power and 
danger”––represent the potential of uncontrollable heterosexual desire that is threatening 
to women, who are imagined as “always at (hetero)sexual risk.”43 The idea of a vagina in 
a men’s prison presents the inverse fear, namely, that it would naturally invite penetration 
and therefore rape. Consequently, the incarcerated transfeminine body is the natural target 
of male violence at the same time that it is deeply suspect for seeming to approach, by 
approximating, femininity. These anxieties are centered on a genital imaginary that over-
writes existing sexual violence with a narrative of heterosexist anxiety about the potential 
of a penis to penetrate vaginas and the potential of a vagina to be penetrated. It ignores the 
reality that trans women are disproportionately victims of sexual violence both in and out 
of prisons, regardless of their genitalia,44 and that many cisgender men, who do not have 
vaginas, are nevertheless victims of prison rape.
 
C. Carceral Necropower: Killing the Trans Body
The theory of necropolitics, developed by Achille Mbembé in 2003, offered a correc-
tive to biopolitics for its inability to fully account for contemporary forms of state power 
that are aimed at creating death, not life. 45 Necropolitics posits that sovereignty is further 
defined by the marking out of certain populations for social death, and that it is exercised 
through subjugation, domination, and violence. This leads to the creation of spatially com-
partmentalized “death-worlds, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast 
41  Laurel Westbrook & Kristen Schilt, Doing Gender, Determining Gender: Transgender People, Gender 
Panics, and the Maintenance of the Sex/Gender/Sexuality System, 28 Gender & soC’Y 32, 32 (2013).
42  Id. at 34–35.
43  Id. at 46.
44  See sYlvia rivera law proJeCt, it’s war in here: a report on the treatment oF transGender and 
intersex people in new York state men’s prisons 17 (2007).
45  Achille Mbembé, Necropolitics, 15 pub. Culture 11, 11–12 (Libby Meinties trans., 2003).
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populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living 
dead.”46 
Mbembé’s examples draw primarily from the colonial context; in the carceral context, 
Jessi Lee Jackson identifies analogous “dead zones”: “locations where state actors can 
exercise near-absolute power over life and death.”47 Death worlds or dead zones enclose 
entire populations that are deemed disposable and subjected to what Lauren Berlant terms 
“slow death.”48 It is defined as “the physical wearing out of a population and the deteriora-
tion of people in that population that is very nearly a defining condition of their experience 
and historical existence.”49
Necropolitics builds on biopolitics; it theorizes that the contemporary sovereign activi-
ty of producing biopolitical subjects is intrinsically linked to the exclusion and enclosure of 
populations who are condemned to social and literal death. In Sarah Lamble’s formulation, 
“necropolitics can be understood as technologies of power that (re)produce social relations 
of living and dying, such that some populations are ushered into the worlds of life and vi-
tality, while others are funneled into . . . death worlds.”50 On the relationship between bio-
politics and necropolitics, Jasbir Puar writes: “[Biopolitics] makes its presence known at 
the limits and through the excess of [necropolitics]; [necropolitics] masks the multiplicity 
of its relationships to death and killing in order to enable the proliferation of the latter.”51 
The distinction matters, according to Puar, because: 
holding the two concepts together suggests a need to also attend to the 
multiple spaces of the deflection of death, whether it be in the service of 
the optimization of life or the mechanism by which sheer death is mini-
mized. This bio-necro collaboration conceptually acknowledges biopow-
er’s direct activity in death, while remaining bound to the optimization 
46  Id. at 40 (emphasis in original).
47  Jessi Lee Jackson, Sexual Necropolitics and Prison Rape Elimination, 39 siGns 197, 209 (2013).
48  Lauren Berlant, Slow Death (Sovereignty, Obesity, Lateral Agency), 33 CritiCal inquirY 754, 756 
(2007); Mbembé, supra note 45, at 11–12.
49  Berlant, supra note 48, at 754.
50  Sarah Lamble, Queer Investments in Punitiveness: Sexual Citizenship, Social Movements and the 
Expanding Carceral State, in queer neCropolitiCs 151, 161 (Jin Haritaworn, Adi Kuntsman & Silvia 
Posocco eds., 2014).
51  Jasbir puar, terrorist assemblaGes 35 (2007).
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of life, and necropolitics’ nonchalance toward death even as it seeks out 
killing as a primary aim.52 
Mass incarceration is a significant example of necropolitical power within the borders 
of the United States. Spatially compartmentalized from the “free world,” the contemporary 
prisons are “mass warehouses for poor, racialized and otherwise disenfranchised popula-
tions.”53 As Foucault noted, carceral discipline does not rehabilitate the subject but instead 
marks him out as antisocial.54 Even after prisoners serve their sentences, the criminal re-
cord becomes an impediment to legal employment, which may result in recidivism. Prisons 
not only produce social death but literally subject bodies to slow dying through “the expe-
rience of ‘doing time’.”55 Thus, mass incarceration inscribes social death on a population 
that is marked by race and class by subjecting their bodies to slow dying and living death. 
Jessi Lee Jackson theorized a sexual dimension to the necropolitical violence of prisons. 
Prisons are rife with sexual violence and marked by racialized sexual deviancy.56 Sexual 
violence is naturalized; indeed, it becomes “an institutionalized component of punishment 
behind prison walls.”57 Jackson writes “[u]nderstanding prison as a corporal punishment 
means understanding it as a sexual punishment––a form of sexual violence,” as a singular 
dimension of the total coercion to which a body is subject. However, necropolitical power 
does not act evenly on all prisoners; rather, bodies are differently affected by carceral pow-
er “depending on how their bodies are socially marked as racially or sexually other.”58 The 
placement of a trans woman in a men’s prison enacts a form of sexual violence, as it “sex-
es” her through bodily invasion––invasion of bodily privacy as well as the literal invasion 
of cavities in routine strip searches.59 The transfeminine body is also a target of rape, a form 
52  Id.
53  Lamble, supra note 50, at 161. 
54  FouCault, disCipline & punish, supra note 11, at 266 (“The prison cannot fail to produce delinquents. 
It does so by the very type of existence it imposes on its inmates . . .”).
55  Lamble, supra note 50, at 161.
56  Jackson, supra note 47, at 197–98; see also Elias Vitulli, Racialized Criminality and the Imprisoned 
Trans Body: Adjudicating Access to Gender-Related Medical Treatment in Prisons 37, soC. Just. 53 (2010–
11); puar, terrorist assemblaGes, supra note 51, at 79–113.
57  anGela Y. davis, are prisons obsolete? 77 (2013).
58  Jackson, supra note 47, at 208.
59  See JoeY l. moGul, andrea J. ritChie & kaY whitloCk, Queer (In)justIce: the crImInalIzatIon of 
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of institutionally tolerated punishment for gender non-conformity. Finally, Jackson points 
out that prison “creates more social death for some than for others.”60 Solitary confinement, 
prescribed both as punishment and as “protection” for prisoners from physical violence, is 
the literal embodiment of maximal social death. It is suggested in Kosilek and other cases 
as the only administratively possible way to house a trans woman who has completed SRS.
II. Transmedicalism and the Eighth Amendment
This Part begins with a statement of the two-prong Eighth Amendment test established 
in Estelle v. Gamble, followed by discussion of how courts have applied each prong in 
cases involving trans prisoners’ access to care. This Part summarizes and critiques existing 
judicial decisions on access to care for trans prisoners. A history of the Kosilek litigation 
will follow. 
A. The Eighth Amendment Standard
 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punish-
ments.”61 As the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly, the Amendment speaks to “broad 
and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.”62 Thus, the 
definition of cruel and unusual punishment is not a static one. Rather, the Amendment con-
templates and “must draw its meaning from evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”63 In 1976, the Supreme Court held in Estelle v. Gamble that 
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary 
and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”64 Estelle established 
a two-pronged requirement for Eighth Amendment claims regarding inadequate medical 
care, comprising an objective and a subjective component. In order to assert a viable claim, 
a plaintiff must show that a) she objectively has a serious medical need, and b) the defen-
lGBt PeoPle In the unIted states 101 (2011); see also davis, supra note 57, at 63.
60  Jackson, supra note 47, at 208.
61  u.s. Const. amend. VIII.
62  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 
1968)).
63  Id. at 102 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
64  Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (internal citation omitted)).
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dants subjectively acted, or failed to act, with deliberate indifference to that medical need.65 
1. (Trans)Medical Necessity
In 2013, the Fifth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders (DSM-5) renamed gender identity disorder to gender dysphoria and declassified 
it as a mental disorder. This formal depathologization of transgender identity reflects a 
slow process of cultural destigmatization. Nevertheless, access to gender-affirming care 
remains strictly gatekept by the medical establishment, requiring consultation, diagno-
sis, and administration by licensed medical professionals. Indeed, the very notion of care 
takes a fundamentally transmedicalist view of altering one’s hormonal makeup, secondary 
sex characteristics, genitalia, etc., which marks them as categorically different from other 
modes of body modification, such as piercings, tattoos, or cosmetic surgery.66 So long as 
statutory regulation upholds medical regimes of access to gender-affirming substances and 
procedures, the transmedicalist paradigm is enshrined in the law and underwrites both 
statutory and judicial constructions of the transgender subject. In access-to-care cases, the 
medicalized status of transgender identity has paved a way to constitutional recognition of 
transgender needs and the necessity of gender-affirming care through the Eighth Amend-
ment. Trans plaintiffs and advocates have strategically emphasized the “medical necessity” 
of gender-affirming care as the basis of the Eighth Amendment claim.
Medical necessity is not the only possible framing of trans needs, however, and 
transmedicalism may be a double-edged sword. Disidentification with one’s designat-
ed-gender-at-birth and the desire to inhabit a different gender or gendered body have his-
torically been considered evidence of psychiatric abnormality. Transmedicalism presents 
a narrative that is compelling in its simplicity, but it brings with it a history of reducing 
“transsexualism” to pathology and deviancy. Many young trans people as well as non-bi-
nary and gender non-conforming people are increasingly rejecting the transmedicalist 
paradigm, for a variety of reasons: the criteria for GID diagnosis fail to capture their ex-
perience of gender; it pathologizes trans identity; it creates restrictive regimes of access 
to gender-affirming substances and procedures.67 Full engagement with these critiques of 
transmedicalism would exceed the scope of this Article, but the existence of such critiques 
65  Id. at 106.
66  See the discussion accompanying supra note 6.
67  See, e.g., A Brief Critique of Transmedicalism (Aug. 9, 2016), https://voidwhereinhibited.wordpress.
com/2016/08/09/a-brief-critique-of-transmedicalism/ [https://perma.cc/GZF4-G8NE]; Judith Butler, 
Undiagnosing Gender, in transGender riGhts (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2010).
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cautions one from taking for granted the medicalized narratives of transgender identity 
offered by both plaintiffs and defendants. 
American courts have generally accepted that gender dysphoria is a serious medi-
cal need.68 “There is no reason to treat transsexualism differently than any other psychiatric 
disorder,” the Seventh Circuit wrote in the 1987 case of Meriwether v. Faulkner, finding that 
the plaintiff’s gender dysphoria constituted a “serious medical need” for Eighth Amend-
ment purposes.69 Thus, “a transsexual inmate is constitutionally entitled to some type of 
medical treatment.”70 However, courts have floundered in the face of competing views as to 
the best treatment for transgender people. They have even failed to distinguish conversion 
therapy––harmful pseudoscientific practices meant to “cure” gay and trans people of their 
non-normative sexual orientation or gender identity71––from medical care. In Meriweth-
er, although the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment for the defendant, 
it took care to emphasize that the plaintiff was not “entitled” specifically to the estrogen 
therapy she sought, or any type of treatment in particular.72 Characterizing gender identity 
disorder as “a medically recognized psychological disorder,”73 the court discussed two pri-
or cases in which trans prisoners sued because they were provided mental health treatment 
instead of the gender-affirming hormone therapy they sought.74 In one case, a trans wom-
an was also given testosterone replacement therapy, a disturbing and extremely harmful 
kind of conversion therapy.75 Neither prevailed on their Eighth Amendment claims. The 
Meriwether court agreed with both decisions that the courts should defer to “the informed 
68  De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520 (4th Cir. 2013); Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011); Allard 
v. Gomez, 9 F. App’x. 793, 794 (9th Cir. 2001). 
69  Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987).
70  Id. (emphasis added). 
71  See generally Mark Potok, Quacks: ‘Conversion Therapists,’ the Anti-LGBT Right, and the 
Demonization of Homosexuality, s. povertY l. Ctr. (May 25, 2016), https://www.splcenter.org/20160525/
quacks-conversion-therapists-anti-lgbt-right-and-demonization-homosexuality [https://perma.cc/N4LH-
QENK]; The Lies and Dangers of Efforts to Change Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, human riGhts 
CampaiGn, https://www.hrc.org/resources/the-lies-and-dangers-of-reparative-therapy [https://perma.cc/98V7-
Z9KJ].
72  Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 413.
73  Id. (discussing Supre v. Ricketts, 729 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1987) and Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F. Supp. 
351 (D. Kan. 1986)).
74  Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 413.
75  Id.
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judgment of prison officials as to the appropriate form of medical treatment.”76
Thus, while seemingly favorable to transgender prisoners, the Meriwether deci-
sion leaves open the chilling and very present possibility that prison officials could provide 
inappropriate or abusive care to fulfill their constitutional obligations. The court seems to 
assume that any care is better than no care, leaving the definition of such care to the dis-
cretion of “prison officials.” Acknowledging the controversy over the appropriate course 
of treatment for gender dysphoria, the court seems uncomfortable to do more than defer to 
prison officials in determining what to provide to a transgender prisoner. Of course, courts 
do not have the expertise to make such determinations themselves, but the plaintiff in Meri-
wether had named in her complaint two physicians who had provided her hormone therapy 
prior to incarceration.77 The court makes passing mention of this but declines to comment 
further on the availability of medical expertise. The end result is that the defendants in the 
Eighth Amendment case are left with full discretion to selectively deny treatment or pro-
vide inappropriate “care” to trans inmates.
2. Deliberate Indifference
The second prong of Estelle, the subjective standard of deliberate indifference, might 
be considered a check on the problem of giving prison officials so much discretion that it 
swallows the plaintiff’s objective medical needs. Instead, however, the Estelle Court char-
acterizes the subjective prong as a limitation on valid Eighth Amendment claims. “Inadver-
tent failure to provide adequate medical care” is not a violation of the Eighth Amendment.78 
Nor is medical malpractice, which cannot rise to the level of a constitutional violation 
“merely because the victim is a prisoner.”79 The plaintiff must show that the defendants 
exhibited deliberate indifference to her serious medical need, which cannot always be in-
ferred from medical mistreatment. “It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence and 
error in good faith that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments clause.”80 
Unfortunately, the structure of this constitutional analysis takes more interest in the de-
76  Id. (emphasis added).
77  Id.
78  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).
79  Id. at 106.
80  Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06).
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fendants’ liabilities than the plaintiff’s rights. The security norm of sex segregation invades 
the analysis. This is clear in Judge Wolf’s formulation of the standard in the first Kosilek 
opinion (“Kosilek I”), as he writes:
It is conceivable that a prison official, acting reasonably and in good faith, 
might perceive an irreconcilable conflict between his duty to protect safety 
and his duty to provide an inmate adequate medical care. If so, his de-
cision not to provide that care might not violate the Eighth Amendment 
because the resulting infliction of pain on the inmate would not be unnec-
essary or wanton. Rather, it might be reasonable and reasonable conduct 
does not violate the Eighth Amendment.81
Stated at this level of abstraction, the argument is hard to dispute. In reality, trans people 
face severe discrimination in accessing health care, and the notion of inadvertence should 
be especially suspect in the climate of pervasive ignorance and prejudice.82 Judge Wolf 
assumes a “reasonable prison official” might “reasonably and in good faith” perceive an 
“irreconcilable conflict,” but why must we accept that premise? The passage suggests that 
it is reasonable to assume that trans bodies threaten “safety” in a nebulous general sense. 
There is even the implication that the provision of gender-affirming care would increase 
rather than diminish the threat, as the flourishing of trans autonomy is directly counter to 
the carceral norms of sex segregation and slow death. The reasonable prison official’s di-
lemma asks us to accept as reasonable the triumph of carceral norms over trans well-being. 
The denial of gender-affirming care often only creates or aggravates existing mental health 
issues. In its explication of the Eighth Amendment, the court reveals its refusal to intervene 
in the denial of trans health care when doing so serves security interests, in the absence of 
the defendant’s specific psychological attitude (“obduracy and wantonness”). 
Care for trans people in any meaningful sense must be aimed at affirming gender or 
alleviating dysphoria––as these strategies improve the health and well-being of trans peo-
ple. Yet transphobia sustains the continued existence of frequently harmful and traumatic 
conversion therapy and treatments premised on transness as delusional and defective. The 
safe haven of “inadvertence” 83 can be a convenient mask for prejudice, or any number of 
other improper reasons to deny appropriate care. The difficulty of proving subjective intent 
81  Kosilek v. Maloney (Kosilek I), 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 161 (D. Mass. 2002) (emphasis added).
82  Jaime M. Grant et al., National Transgender Discrimination Survey: Report on Health and Health 
Care, in nat’l Ctr. For transGender equalitY & nat’l GaY & lesbian task ForCe (2010).
83  Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 242 (D. Mass. 2012); Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 161.
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in court creates an additional obstacle for trans plaintiffs, who face enormous information 
asymmetries and must rely on discovery to obtain evidence. Their claims may not survive 
summary judgment or even a motion to dismiss because as a federal court plaintiff, they 
must plead facts sufficient to state a facially plausible claim.84 
In the 2011 case of Battista v. Clarke, the First Circuit seemed to recognize the harsh-
ness of this standard and opined that “deliberate indifference” may be found even in the 
absence of “any established sinister motive or ‘purpose’ to do harm.”85 Rather, an excessive 
pattern of “delays, poor explanations, missteps, changes in position and rigidities,” may be 
used to infer deliberate indifference on the part of the Department of Correction.86 Just like 
the defendants in Battista, the DOC in Soneeya v. Spencer “responded to recommendations 
of their own medical advisers regarding treatment for GID inmates by going ‘back and 
forth looking for an out.’” Since Meriwether, the opinions have emphasized that federal 
courts will generally defer to the “informed judgment” of prison officials as to the appro-
priate treatment for trans inmates, so long as there is one. The Seventh Circuit’s emphasis 
in Meriwether on federal court deference to “the informed judgment of prison officials 
as to the appropriate form of medical treatment” is echoed in Kosilek I (“informed medi-
cal judgment”) and then in Soneeya (“considered judgment”).87 However, there can be no 
informed judgment in the absence of an individualized medical assessment: the Soneeya 
decision, which found that the defendant was deliberately indifferent, characterized the 
DOC’s error as “approach[ing] Ms. Soneeya’s needs as a legal, rather than a medical, prob-
lem, and [failing] to offer her the type of individualized medical assessment that the law 
requires.”88 The interchangeable use of the terms “informed judgment of prison officials” 
and “individualized medical assessment” suggests that the court is conflating precisely the 
legal (or rather, administrative) and medical determinations of the appropriate treatment.89 
The 2010 GID policy discussed by the court in Soneeya includes security review of treat-
ment possibilities.90 Thus, the “prison officials” whose judgment determines the care pro-
84  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
85  Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 455 (1st Cir. 2011).
86  Id.
87  Soneeya, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 248; Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 186 (quoting Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 
415).
88  Soneeya, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 248. 
89  Id.
90  Id. at 238–40, 247; mass. dep’t oF Corr., 103 DOC 652 (2010).
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vided to a trans prisoner includes both prison administrators and medical personnel. This 
reinforces the troubling ambiguity as to whose “deliberate indifference” in denying care 
must be shown, and therefore, what is truly driving decisions about adequate care: medical 
judgment, or carceral interests.
Courts also began to recognize “deliberate indifference” where there was a blanket 
statute or policy banning certain treatments or procedures, obviating the possibility of an 
“individualized medical assessment” required to provide adequate care under the Eighth 
Amendment.91 In 2011, the Seventh Circuit held in Fields v. Smith that a state statute impos-
ing a blanket bar on gender-affirming care (hormone treatment and SRS) for inmates was 
unconstitutional on Eighth Amendment grounds.92 The following year, Katheena Soneeya 
prevailed in the Massachusetts District Court, which found deliberate indifference in the 
DOC’s failure to provide her the individualized medical assessment she was entitled to 
under the Eighth Amendment.93 Finally, the landmark settlement of Diamond v. Owens in 
early 2016 seemed to sound the death knell for “freeze-frame” policies and other policies 
categorically barring the provision of gender-affirming care in prisons.94 Ashley Diamond, 
a 37-year-old woman incarcerated in a Georgia state men’s correctional facility, was denied 
the feminizing hormones she had been taking for seventeen years and was sexually as-
saulted by other inmates. She brought suit in early 2015 against the Georgia Department of 
Corrections (GDOC), asserting violations of the Eighth Amendment for the harms she ex-
perienced from estrogen withdrawal. The GDOC had a “freeze-frame” policy that placed a 
blanket denial on providing gender-affirming treatment to inmates beyond what they were 
receiving prior to incarceration.95 The case received significant media coverage and elicited 
the interest of the federal government.96 In April 2015, the United States Department of 
Justice filed a Statement of Interest in Diamond declaring its view that “Failure to provide 
individualized and appropriate medical care for inmates suffering from gender dysphoria 
91  See Soneeya, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 242.
92  Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 559 (7th Cir. 2011).
93  Soneeya, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 248. 
94  See Diamond v. Owens, 131 F. Supp. 3d 1346 (M.D. Ga. 2015).
95  Id. at 1355. Diamond was denied access even though she had been on a hormonal regimen for a decade 
and a half prior to incarceration. Although the GDOC knew she was a trans woman, she was “not evaluated 
for gender dysphoria, referred for treatment, or given a reasonably safe or appropriate housing placement.” 
96  Columbia Law Women’s Association Honors LGBT Advocate Chinyere Ezie ’10, Columbia law sCh. 
(Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_events/2016/april2016/Myra-Bradwell-
Dinner-2016 [https://perma.cc/G9XL-RF4T].
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violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.”97 Shortly 
thereafter, the GDOC rescinded its “freeze-frame” policy. The settlement of the case in 
February 2016 triggered similar policy changes nationwide.98
Having finally arrived at a sort of consensus around the constitutional prerequisite 
of individualized medical assessment for adequate medical care, courts had only left to 
resolve the question of what penological interests may outweigh a prisoner’s right to ad-
equate medical care for gender dysphoria. Unfortunately, around the same time the DOJ 
announced its view that blanket denials of hormone therapy constituted a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari on Kosilek v. Spencer, 
putting an end to litigation that spanned two decades.99 Kosilek v. Spencer presented the 
novel situation in which prison officials refused to provide SRS, which had been prescribed 
to Kosilek by the prison’s own doctors as the only form of adequate medical care.100 This 
refusal was justified on the basis of the prison’s security interests. 
B. The Kosilek Litigation
In 1992, Kosilek filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Sheriff of 
Bristol County in the District Court of Massachusetts, alleging the denial of adequate med-
ical care for her serious medical need in violation of her Eighth Amendment rights, seeking 
damages and injunctive relief.101 The complaint was amended to seek the same relief from 
the DOC after she was transferred to its custody at MCI-Norfolk.102 The case proceeded 
slowly through motion practice and discovery for years.103 Defendant Michael Maloney be-
97  Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, Diamond v. Owens, 131 F. Supp. 3d 1346 (M.D. Ga. 
2015) (No. 5:15-cv-00050-MTT).
98  Ashley Diamond v. Brian Owens, et al., s. povertY. l. Ctr., https://www.splcenter.org/seeking-justice/
case-docket/ashley-diamond-v-brian-owens-et-al [https://perma.cc/QJV3-WNYK]; see also Deborah Sontag, 
Georgia Says It Will Allow Hormones for Transgender Inmates, n.Y. times (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.
nytimes.com/2015/04/10/us/georgia-says-it-will-allow-hormones-for-transgender-inmate.html [https://perma.
cc/8QK3-3SJG].
99  Kosilek v. O’Brien, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015).
100 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 196 (D. Mass. 2012).
101 Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 2014).
102 Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 159 (D. Mass. 2002).
103 Kosilek III, 740 F.3d 733, 736 (1st Cir. 2014).
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came the Commissioner of the DOC in 1997, and a defendant in the case in 1999.104 As the 
court would point out, the Commissioner is not usually responsible for decisions relating 
to the administration of medical care and therefore would not usually be the appropriate 
defendant for a denial of adequate care claim. In 2000, Commissioner Maloney adopted a 
blanket freeze-frame policy in response to Kosilek’s lawsuit. Since Kosilek had only taken 
black market hormones and never received a prescription for it, she was prohibited from 
accessing hormones under this policy. The policy also categorically excluded the possibil-
ity of SRS for any prisoner.105 Maloney retained Dr. Marshall Forstein, a specialist in GID, 
to serve as an expert in the litigation.106 When Dr. Forstein recommended hormones and 
SRS, the DOC terminated its relationship with him.107
In December 2000, still not having obtained any care, Kosilek filed a second lawsuit 
with similar claims.108 Her first lawsuit proceeded to a non-jury trial in 2002 presided over 
by District Judge Wolf. The court found that Kosilek’s “gender identity disorder” mani-
fested a serious medical need within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment and accept-
ed the Harry Benjamin Standards of Care, international guidelines for GID treatment, as 
authoritative.109 However, the court also found that she failed to satisfy the second prong 
of Estelle, which required a showing that the prison officials who denied care did so with 
deliberate indifference.110 Although he found for the defendants, Judge Wolf concluded his 
opinion with a thinly veiled reprimand: “The court expects that, educated by the trial record 
and this decision, [Commissioner] Maloney and his colleagues will in the future attempt to 
discharge properly their constitutional duties to Kosilek.”111
After Kosilek v. Maloney (“Kosilek I”) was handed down, the DOC lifted its freeze-
frame policy.112 Changes in an inmate’s gender-affirming care regimen would be medically 
104 Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 159.
105 Id. at 159–160.
106 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 215.
107 Id. at 215–16.
108 Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d 63, 63 (1st Cir. 2014). 
109 Now the World Professional Association for Transgender Health. History, world proF’l ass’n For 
transGender health, https://www.wpath.org/about/history [https://perma.cc/KLD2-LT88].
110 Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 195.
111 Id. at 193.
112 See Kosilek III, 740 F.3d 733, 740 (1st Cir. 2014); Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 218 (D. Mass. 
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determined by the entity DOC contracted to provide medical services, the University of 
Massachusetts Correctional Health Program (UMass).113 In February 2003, Commission-
er Maloney engaged a gender dysphoria specialist, David Seil, MD, to evaluate Kosilek 
in consultation with Dr. Appelbaum in his role as director of the UMass Mental Health 
Program, as per DOC policy.114 Dr. Seil recommended hormone therapy and electrolysis, 
with consideration for feminizing surgical procedures down the line. Kosilek thus began 
receiving hormone therapy in August, and was also provided female undergarments and 
makeup.115 
In December 2003, Maloney was succeeded by his Deputy Commissioner Kathleen 
Dennehy.116 As commissioner, Dennehy “was determined not to be the first prison official 
to provide an inmate sex reassignment surgery” and “testified that she would retire rather 
than obey an order from the Supreme Court to do so.”117 After Dr. Seil recommended SRS, 
Dennehy fired him.118 She cut off certain treatments Kosilek and other transgender pris-
oners had been receiving under the pretext of reviewing their cases.119 Although medical 
specialists are usually hired by DOC physicians, Dennehy had the DOC retain Cynthia Os-
borne as a consultant social worker. Osborne had a professional history of advising correc-
tions departments that SRS was not appropriate for trans prisoners.120 Osborne worked for 
the Johns Hopkins Center for Sexual Health and Medicine, whose Psychiatry Department 
leadership was outspoken about its religious and moral objections to SRS.121 
In 2007, Dennehy was succeeded by Commissioner Harold Clarke. Clarke later testi-
fied at trial that SRS presented “insurmountable” “safety and security concerns.”122 These 
2012).
113 Kosilek III, 740 F.3d at 740.
114 Id. 
115 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 218; Kosilek III, 740 F.3d at 741.
116 Kosilek III, 740 F.3d at 741.
117 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 201. 
118 Id. at 219. 
119 Id. at 201–02.
120 Id. at 202.
121 Id. at 221.
122 Id. at 228–29; Kosilek III, 740 F.3d 733, 755 (1st Cir. 2014).
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included flight risk during transportation to surgery out of state and problems with housing 
Kosilek after the operation. Furthermore, he opined that providing Kosilek with surgery 
“in response to her threats of suicide” was contrary to correctional practice, and would be 
tantamount to ceding to manipulative inmate behavior.123 
Kosilek II proceeded to a non-jury trial in 2006, also presided over by (then Chief) 
Judge Wolf. A parade of medical and corrections experts testified. After reviewing the 
voluminous record, the district court found in 2012 that the DOC’s continued refusal to 
provide Kosilek with gender-affirming genital surgery, despite such surgery having been 
deemed medically necessary by the DOC’s doctors, evinced deliberate indifference and 
thus fulfilled the second prong of the Eighth Amendment test. In particular, it found the 
security reasons cited by Commissioners Dennehy and Clarke as justification for why SRS 
could not be provided to be utterly pretextual and was unpersuaded by their assertions that 
their denial of SRS was not related to considerations of cost or potential public backlash. 
The court granted a narrowly tailored injunction ordering the DOC to provide Kosilek with 
surgical care as promptly as possible, reserving the question of how any genuine security 
issues should be resolved to the DOC’s expertise.124 
Unfortunately, corrections officials remained uncooperative. Kosilek’s lawyers offered 
to waive the attorneys’ fees they were owed if the prison would refrain from filing an 
appeal.125 However, the DOC announced its appeal before the parties even met to discuss 
attorneys’ fees.126
On appeal in 2014, a panel of three judges on the First Circuit initially affirmed the de-
cision, ruling two to one for Kosilek (Kosilek III).127 Reviewing the district court’s decision 
for clear error with deference to its factual findings, the court affirmed the finding that SRS 
was the only adequate treatment for Kosilek and that the DOC had no valid penological 
123 Kosilek III, 740 F.3d at 755.
124 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 250–51.
125 Mem. In Supp. Of Pl.’s Mot. For Award of Att’y’s Fees and Costs, Kosilek II, 740 F.3d 733 (1st Cir. 
2014) (No. 001-2455-MLW); see also Denise Lavoie, Inmate Seeking Sex Change Eligible For Legal Fees, 
assoCiated press, Sept. 17, 2012.
126 Mem. In Supp. Of Pl.’s Mot. For Award of Att’y’s Fees and Costs, Kosilek II, 740 F.3d 733 (1st Cir. 
2014) (No. 001-2455-MLW).
127 Kosilek III, 740 F.3d.
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reason for denying it.128 Circuit Judge Torruella filed a dissenting opinion. He disagreed 
with the majority’s judgment that the majority of issues in the case were factual and that 
clear error was therefore the appropriate standard of review.129 Judge Torruella further con-
tended that the district court erred in its conclusions that a) the DOC’s preferred treatment 
plan for Kosilek, not involving SRS, was not medically prudent, b) the treatment she was 
currently receiving was not constitutionally adequate to ameliorate her risk of suicide, and 
c) the DOC’s security concerns were illegitimate.130 Ultimately, Judge Torruella reprimand-
ed the district court and the First Circuit majority for losing sight, in his view, of the limits 
of what the Eighth Amendment proscribes.131
Upon rehearing en banc, the full First Circuit reversed 3–2 (Kosilek IV).132 This time, 
Judge Torruella wrote for the majority. Rehashing the lengthy factual record and expanding 
on the points made in his earlier dissent, he disagreed with the standard of review em-
ployed in Kosilek III and the district court’s analysis of both prongs of Estelle. Arguing that 
“[t]he ultimate legal conclusion of whether prison administrators have violated the Eighth 
Amendment is reviewed de novo,” he disagreed with the district court’s conclusions on 
both prongs of the Estelle test. On the objective prong, although Kosilek’s gender dyspho-
ria was indisputably a serious medical need, Judge Torruella argued that the DOC’s deci-
sion to not provide SRS did not run afoul of the Eighth Amendment given its provision of 
other forms of care, including hormone therapy, psychotherapy, and antidepressants. The 
opinion also argued that Kosilek had ultimately failed to show “deliberate indifference,” 
and that the district court clearly erred in concluding that the DOC had made its determi-
nation based on “a legitimate concern for Kosilek’s safety and the security of the DOC’s 
facility.”133
Despite rehashing essentially all the same points articulated in all prior opinions, the 
First Circuit reached a different conclusion. Due to “security concerns” posed by providing 
genital surgery that were within corrections officers’ discretion, Kosilek did not demon-
128 Id. at 772–73.
129 Id. at 776 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014).
133 Id. at 92–93.
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strate deliberate indifference and could not prevail on her Eighth Amendment claim.134 
Judge Thompson, the author of the Kosilek III opinion, wrote a lengthy dissent dis-
puting the legitimacy of the en banc grant and sharply disagreeing with the majority’s 
standard of review. She argued that the majority erred in applying a standard that afforded 
almost no deference to the district court’s factual findings, and that deliberate indifference 
in the Eighth Amendment context “is a ‘state-of-mind issue’ that usually presents a jury 
question.” Deference to the lower court was particularly warranted in this case given the 
volume of the record. Finally, echoing Kosilek’s arguments, Judge Thompson criticized the 
majority decision for creating a de facto ban on SRS for transgender prisoners in the cir-
cuit, violating the established Eighth Amendment requirement for individualized medical 
assessment that does not permit blanket prohibitions on particular forms of treatment.135 
In May 2015, the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari on Kosilek IV, spelling 
the dismaying conclusion to two full decades of litigation. In July 2015, Kosilek filed a pro 
se complaint in Massachusetts state court, attempting once again to have her rights upheld. 
It was dismissed on the basis of res judicata and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal.136
III. Narrating Michelle Kosilek
Born in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois, Kosilek knew as early as age three that she was a 
girl.137 She was abandoned by her mother at an orphanage around the age of five, where 
she spent most of her early childhood.138 Kosilek would go to the girls’ dorms to play with 
the other girls and try on their clothes––when caught, she was beaten.139 After returning to 
the care of her mother, she continued to experience abuse by family members, especially 
134 Id. at 96.
135 Id. at 106–07 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
136 Kosilek v. McFarland, No. 16-P-879, 2017 WL 3393467, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 8, 2017).
137 Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 158 (D. Mass. 2002); Report or Affidavit of Dr. David Seil, M.D., 
Kosilek v. Clarke, No. 00CV12455 (D. Mass. Feb. 23, 2003), 2003 WL 25910594.
138 Report or Affidavit of Chester W. Schmidt, Jr., M.D. at *3, Kosilek v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 00CV12455 
(D. Mass. Nov. 23, 2005), 2005 WL 5680039; Nathaniel Penn, Should This Inmate Get a State-Financed 
Sex Change Operation?, new republiC, Oct. 30, 2013, https://newrepublic.com/article/115335/sex-change-
prison-inmate-michelle-kosilek-should-we-pay [https://perma.cc/V2BX-HKM9].
139 Report or Affidavit of Dr. David Seil, M.D. at *2, Kosilek v. Clarke, No. 00CV12455 (D. Mass. Feb. 
23, 2003), 2003 WL 25910594.
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when she was caught wearing girls’ clothes.140 On one occasion, she was stabbed by her 
stepfather with a broken beer bottle.141 From the age of ten she was raped weekly by her 
grandfather for two years.142 By the age of twelve, Kosilek had become a child prostitute.143 
From adolescence, she desperately sought access to feminizing hormones, sometimes 
at the price of further abuse: one doctor prescribed estrogen in exchange for sexual fa-
vors.144 Kosilek struggled with substance addiction throughout adulthood.145 Nevertheless, 
she obtained a college degree from New Hampshire College in psychology and counsel-
ing.146 
Throughout adolescence and adulthood, Kosilek desperately sought feminizing hor-
mones as she struggled with the effects of childhood trauma and substance abuse. In 1971 
and 1972, Kosilek received a stable period of hormone therapy.147 On hormones, she “felt 
140 Id. (“At age 13, she developed what was most likely normal gynecomastia. She commented to her 
mother, ‘See? I really am a girl.’ Her stepfather overheard the remark and assaulted her with a broken beer 
bottle. This began a series of running away, eventually completely leaving the home at age 15.”); Penn, supra 
note 138 (“When he [sic passim] showed his mother that his breasts, as a result of a hormonal condition 
during puberty, had begun growing, her boyfriend beat him with a fiberglass fishing pole, then made him 
kneel on a layer of uncooked rice.”); John M. Crisp, Sex-Change Operation for Robert Kosilek Would Be 
Humane, newsdaY (Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.newsday.com/opinion/oped/sex-change-operation-for-
robert-kosilek-would-be-humane-john-m-crisp-1.3988015 [https://perma.cc/C2AX-YTXD] (“He [sic passim] 
was abused as a child. When he announced that he wanted to live as a girl, his stepfather stabbed him.”).
141 Report or Affidavit of Dr. David Seil, M.D. at *2, Kosilek v. Clarke, No. 00CV12455 (D. Mass. Feb. 
23, 2003), 2003 WL 25910594. 
142 Report or Affidavit of Chester W. Schmidt, Jr., M.D. at *3, Kosilek v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 00CV12455 
(D. Mass. Nov. 23, 2005), 2005 WL 5680039; Penn, supra note 138. 
143 Penn, supra note 138 (“He [sic passim] was frequently punished for dressing as a girl, and his 
mother’s father began raping him. Gradually, he realized he could earn more with his body than the dollar 
his grandfather gave him every week, and at the age of twelve, he became a child prostitute on the streets of 
Chicago.”).
144 Crisp, supra note 140.
145 Penn, supra note 138.
146 Report or Affidavit of Chester W. Schmidt, Jr., M.D. at *3, Kosilek v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 00CV12455 
(D. Mass. Nov. 23, 2005), 2005 WL 5680039. 
147 Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Mass. 2002).
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normal” for the first time in her life.148 Off hormones, she relapsed into substance abuse.149 
“A brief marriage occurred in 1974,” noted Dr. Seil.150 Dr. Chester Schmidt writes: 
“The first marriage lasted about ½ years. The second marriage was to her therapist in 
her drug rehabilitation program. This marriage ended in 1990 when Kosilek strangled her 
spouse and was convicted of first-degree murder.”151
In 1983, upon entering yet another drug rehabilitation facility, Kosilek expressed that 
the root of her substance addiction was gender dysphoria.152 She was assigned to a drug 
counselor with expertise in “sexual issues.” Her name was Cheryl McCaul, and she pro-
posed a cure for Kosilek’s “condition”: “the love of a good woman.”153 McCaul initiated 
physical intimacy with her patient in subsequent counselling sessions.154 She invited Ko-
silek to move in four months later and the two were married within the year.155 John Crisp 
writes, bluntly, “McCaul . . . believed that she could cure [Kosilek] of [her] transexualism 
by marrying [her]. It didn’t work.”156 The second marriage was “tumultuous.”157 One day 
in 1990, an argument escalated into an altercation, and the altercation led to Kosilek stran-
gling McCaul to death.
The opinion for Commonwealth v. Kosilek (1996) describes an audiotape recording 
from a series of interviews that Kosilek had recorded and given to a television news report-
148 Id.
149 Id. at 163–64.
150 Report or Affidavit of Dr. David Seil, M.D. at *2, Kosilek v. Clarke, No. 00CV12455 (D. Mass. Feb. 
23, 2003), 2003 WL 25910594.
151 Report or Affidavit of Chester W. Schmidt, Jr., M.D. at *3, Kosilek v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 00CV12455 
(D. Mass. Nov. 23, 2005), 2005 WL 5680039.
152 Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 164; Penn, supra note 138 (“‘Have you heard of Christine Jorgensen? . 
. . I’m like her, and that’s why I’ve been a drunk for most of my life.’ Christine Jorgensen was an American 
actress who became famous for being one of the first people to receive SRS.”).
153 Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 164.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Crisp, supra note 140.
157 Report or Affidavit of Dr. David Seil, M.D. at *2, Kosilek v. Clarke, No. 00CV12455 (D. Mass. Feb. 
23, 2003), 2003 WL 25910594.
Columbia Journal of Gender and law 28537.2
er in October 1992, which was played for the jury at her trial: 
During the interview, the defendant stated that: on the day of the murder, 
[she] and the victim had been in an argument; the victim threw boiling tea 
into the defendant’s face; [s]he then knocked the victim down; she [i.e. 
the victim] grabbed a butcher knife and chased the defendant into another 
room, threatening to kill [her]; [s]he picked up a piece of wire that had 
been on a table; and this was all [s]he was able to recall until [s]he woke 
up days later in the hospital. The defendant stated in the interview that [s]
he ‘probably, because of the trauma of it . . . went into a black out at that 
moment.’ . . . ‘Apparently, I did take her life. It was probably in self-de-
fense.’158 
Some writers suggest that the altercation happened when McCaul came home to find 
Kosilek wearing her clothes, which enraged her.159 In a 2013 interview, Kosilek recalled 
that they fought because Kosilek thought her wife “wasn’t strict enough with her older 
son.” Kosilek maintains that she acted in self-defense.160
Kosilek was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced in 1992 to life in prison 
without parole.161 At MCI-Norfolk, Kosilek changed her legal name to Michelle and began 
to present as a woman.162 
A. Proving Life
This section discusses the biopolitical framing of Kosilek’s body in the courts’ discus-
sion of whether she deserved access to gender-affirming genital surgery. Specifically, it 
identifies two points in the opinions that reveal the limitations of biopolitics. The first is an 
158 Commonwealth v. Kosilek, 423 Mass. 449, 452 (1996).
159 Penn, supra note 138 (“There are competing accounts of what happened. Did Cheryl and [Kosilek] 
argue because [Kosilek] had relapsed after eight years of sobriety? Because she had discovered [Kosilek] 
wearing her clothes?”); Crisp, supra note 140 (“When [McCaul] discovered Kosilek wearing her clothes in 
1990, she became angry. Kosilek strangled her.”).
160 Penn, supra note 138 (“I took my best friend’s life because I was afraid that she was going to take 
mine.”).
161 Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 164 (D. Mass. 2002).
162 Kosilek wears her hair long, tailors her clothing to appear feminine, uses cosmetics, and has undertaken 
voice feminization. See id.
Columbia Journal of Gender and law286 37.2
aspect of the transmedicalist requirements for eligibility for SRS, which includes having a 
“real life experience” of one’s gender. The second is the use of suicidality as a metric for 
validating Kosilek’s gender dysphoria and gender identity.
The World Professional Association for Transgender Health’s Standards of Care for 
the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender Nonconforming People (WPATH-
SOC)163 are non-binding protocols for the treatment of individuals with gender dysphoria. 
According to the version of WPATH-SOC that was current at the time of Kosilek II, a trans-
gender individual diagnosed with gender dysphoria may be eligible for SRS after a period 
of hormone therapy and at least one year of “real life experience” living and presenting as 
their preferred gender. 
One point of contention throughout the Kosilek litigation was the question of whether 
it was possible for Kosilek to have a “real life experience” as a woman while incarcerat-
ed. Several experts opined that she could not, and that therefore Kosilek did not meet the 
requirements for SRS eligibility under WPATH-SOC.164 Kosilek’s doctors responded that 
“[t]he point of having a [real life experience] is to provide the person with an awareness 
of what to expect in a different gender role.”165 Persuaded by this argument, the district 
court wrote in Kosilek I that “the evidence at trial indicated that the prison environment has 
provided Kosilek with an even more stringent ‘real life experience’ test than many trans-
sexuals would have outside prison, because inmates are constantly under observation and 
any failure to live as a woman would be readily noted.”166 Yet another view is that because 
Kosilek has a life sentence, she is already having as much of a real life experience as she 
can ever have.167 
The conditioning of SRS eligibility on “real life experience,” as intimated by Kosilek’s 
doctors, reflects a medical exercise of gendered disciplinary power. Acclimation to a nor-
mative gender role is required prior to bodily modification, so as to discipline trans bodies 
163 Formerly known as the Harry Benjamin Standards of Care, and referred to in the Kosilek opinions as 
such. the world proFessional assoCiation For transGender health, standards oF Care For the health oF 
transsexual, transGender, and Gender nonConForminG people 1 (7th ed. 2011), https://www.wpath.org/
publications/soc [https://perma.cc/XF49-YEL4].
164 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 233–35 (D. Mass. 2012); Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 173–74. 
165 Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 235.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 232.
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into fully-fledged transgender subjects. In the carceral context, this biopolitical norm is 
thrown into question. If, as the defendants’ witnesses suggest, there can be no “real life 
experience” in prison, it must be because the prison is a site of social death where ordinary 
socialization into gender norms is dysfunctional. 
There is a level of existential horror in the idea that trans people cannot have a “real 
life experience” of gender in prison, as though experiences in prison are somehow unreal. 
Indeed, it is especially ironic given the particular severity with which gender norms are 
enforced in carceral spaces, as discussed in Part II. The actual lived reality of trans women 
in prison is marred by physical and sexual violence enacted by both state and non-state 
actors. If anything, that experience of heightened violence is a distinguishing feature of 
incarceration for trans women. Thus, to suggest that trans people cannot have “real life 
experiences” of gender in the carceral context replaces the reality of gendered violence and 
sex segregation with a blank, where the empirical content of an imagined carceral gender 
must be filled in. This approaches the limits of the biopolitical imagination, as the contem-
porary prison is not primarily a biopolitical institution designed to optimize bodies. As the 
defendants’ position suggests, there is no such thing as carceral gender in the sense that 
necropolitical power only reproduces gender as a marker for non-normativity that invites 
discipline and sexual violence. 
 
This analysis exposes the circularity of gender as a biopolitical construct. At every 
stage of her interaction with medical personnel and throughout the litigation, Kosilek must 
prove her womanhood to achieve access to gender-affirming somatechnics, including gen-
ital surgery. Genital surgery is necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, for her to achieve 
legal recognition as a woman within the carceral regime of sex segregation. Thus, in the 
carceral context, the biopolitically produced trans body is caught in a vise. In the same way, 
Kosilek’s suicidality is constantly noted by the opinions as evincing the seriousness of her 
medical need. This linking of suicidality with trans identity creates a dilemma that calls to 
mind the 16th and 17th century European practice of trial by drowning as a method of test-
ing whether a woman was a witch. A successful drowning was proof of innocence, while 
survival made one suspect.168 Similarly, the opinions debate whether Kosilek’s suicidality 
is evidence of suffering or a blackmailing tactic designed to elicit a benefit from prison 
officials. Defendants seem to suggest that the fact that she currently survives is evidence 
that she is getting along well enough without gender-affirming genital surgery. The district 
court implicitly reinforces this logic by doubling down on suicidality as proof of the seri-
168 See, e.g., The Swimming of Witches, the Foxearth and dist. loCal historY soC’Y, http://www.
foxearth.org.uk/SwimmingOfWitches.html [https://perma.cc/5V52-AY46].
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ousness of her medical need. Had its opinion not been reversed, this would have created an 
undesirable precedent by which an Eighth Amendment entitlement to SRS might only exist 
where a prisoner is at imminent risk of death due to gender dysphoria. 
B. Gendering Death
The implicit requirement that Kosilek’s gender be proven by her existing in a state 
near death lies at an intersection between biopolitical and necropolitical power. Suicide 
marks the limits of both regimes of power. In the biopolitical framework, it “testified to 
the individual and private right to die, at the borders and in the interstices of power that 
was exercised over life.”169 In the necropolitical framework, Mbembé theorizes suicide as 
a potential act of resistance.170 
In Kosilek, two conflicting readings of suicide clash directly in the courts’ reasoning. 
As discussed, the biopolitical framework treats suicide as evidence of medical seriousness 
and necessity. In the necropolitical framework, Kosilek’s suicidal ideation is read as a 
challenge to carceral power, as a way of blackmailing the prison into giving her a boon. 
At trial, Clarke testified that providing Kosilek with care in response to her “threats of 
suicide” would be “contrary to well-established correctional practices.”171 Luis Spencer, 
the Superintendent of MCI-Norfolk, stated that “his policy is not to negotiate with inmates 
who threaten suicide, as to do so would undermine his and the staff’s authority.”172 Another 
corrections authority also “cautioned against giving in to an inmate’s threats of suicide, 
likening it to opening Pandora’s box.”173 In essence, the necropolitical framework reads 
Kosilek’s suicidality as a hostage situation. She is only capable of holding her own body 
hostage in a carceral context, where her body is treated as the property of the state. Thus, 
as defendants and Judge Torruella suggest, an adequate response to the risk of suicide is 
heightened surveillance around the clock and lockdown. This notion of adequacy has been 
completely disconnected from the issue of care. While surveillance and security may be 
methods of preventing literal death, they are not medical care. For a trans prisoner, they 
compound the effects of social death from being trans and being in prison: maximizing her 
experience of social death. 
169 FouCault, historY oF sexualitY, supra note 28, at 139.
170 Mbembé, supra note 45, at 36.
171 Kosilek III, 740 F.3d 733, 755 (1st Cir. 2014).
172 Id. at 749.
173 Id. at 750.
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Kosilek IV ultimately gives credit to the DOC’s expertise on matters of security, hold-
ing that its decision to withhold SRS was within their discretion and did not run afoul of 
the Eighth Amendment. The security issues cited by the defendants that Kosilek II found 
to be pretextual excuses deserve unpacking here, as they spell out the (imagined) threat 
that Kosilek’s post-operative, transfeminine body poses to prison administration. First, 
the term “security” signifies a relationship of power and control between the prison and 
prisoners’ bodies. Its interchangeable use with the word “safety” in defendants’ testimony 
masks the fact that bodies can be secured without being safe. In any case, the security is-
sues spelled out in Kosilek III reveal the ambivalence of the trans body as both a ward of 
the state requiring protection and a threat that must be protected against. Setting aside the 
clearly pretextual issue of flight risk during transit, the other concerns raised by the DOC 
are the possibility that Kosilek would be raped in a male facility, that the presence of Ko-
silek’s body would incite violence among other inmates, and that Kosilek’s placement in a 
women’s prison would pose “serious climate issues.”174 All of these issues arise from the 
question of how Kosilek should be housed after receiving gender-affirming genital surgery. 
Security issues thus arise where sex segregation is confronted by the trans(feminine) body, 
whose presence is viewed as threatening to carceral discipline.
The fear that Kosilek would be sexually assaulted in a male facility might seem, at 
first glance, to be of greater concern to Kosilek herself than the DOC, especially given the 
extent to which sexual violence in prison, particularly against people perceived as gender 
non-conforming, is normalized and tolerated. Fortunately, however, there is no record of 
Kosilek ever having experienced such violence at MCI-Norfolk, despite living in its gener-
al population and presenting as a woman for over two decades.175 This fear, then, expresses 
the erroneous assumption that it is the vagina––the orifice embodying femininity––that 
presents vulnerability to rape, rather than femininity or womanhood.176 Discussing the tes-
timony of defendants, the Kosilek III court also mentions the presence of sex offenders in 
MCI-Norfolk. It is unclear how, combined with Kosilek’s imagined post-surgical body, 
the presence of sex offenders would lead to violence that might injure guards. The lack of 
detail presented by either the defendants or the court leaves one to imagine an amorphous, 
174 Id. at 745.
175 Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 164 (D. Mass. 2002); Report or Affidavit of Chester W. Schmidt, Jr., 
M.D., Kosilek v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 00CV12455 (D. Mass. Nov. 23, 2005), 2005 WL 5680039. 
176 Kosilek III, 740 F.3d at 749 (“[Spencer] would have ‘grave concerns’ putting Kosilek back in the 
general population with the full anatomy of a female. Spencer worried that she could be raped or assaulted 
and he saw no alternative but to house her in the high-security Special Management Unit.”).
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explosive, and sexualized violence that would threaten to erupt upon Kosilek’s return.
For the most part, the opinions do not engage at length with the possibility that Kosilek 
might be incarcerated in a women’s facility. The heightened policing of trans women’s 
access to women’s spaces is evident in defendants’ dismissal of that possibility; and the 
“gender panic”177 raised by that possibility fueled a great deal of media outrage.178 Kosilek 
III discusses the testimony of Superintendent Bissonnette of MCI-Framingham, a Massa-
chusetts woman’s prison.179 Bissonnette testified that she was of the opinion that Kosilek 
was not suitable for incarceration there because she would be “both a potential predator 
and victim within the inmate population.”180 She reasoned that Kosilek would be a po-
tential predator because she had killed her wife, and a potential victim because the many 
inmates at Framingham who were victims of domestic and sexual violence might attempt 
to harm Kosilek, in Bisonnette’s imagination.181 On both counts, this reasoning is almost 
nonsensical when distanced from the justifications for sex segregation and the imputation 
of (presumptively hetero)sexual violence to (particularly male) inmates. Kosilek’s crime 
of conviction is not at all unique; in fact, Bissonnette conceded on cross-examination that 
around forty offenders at MCI-Framingham were also serving life for murder.182 Further-
more, Kosilek does not have a record of perpetrating sexual violence or any other kind 
of violence against women with the exception of her crime of conviction, which makes it 
unclear why she would be a “predator” or why prisoners at Framingham would target her in 
response to their own traumas. All of these theories are incoherent without reference to the 
stereotypical portrayals of trans women as sexual deviants and gleeful killers; the language 
of predation also feeds on this anxiety. Indeed, the media and the courts constantly name 
Kosilek as a “transsexual” and “wife-killer,”183 conceptually conjoining sexual perversion 
177 See supra discussion in Part I § B; Laurel Westbrook and Kristen Schilt, Doing Gender, Determining 
Gender: Transgender People, Gender Panics, and the Maintenance of the Sex/Gender/Sexuality System, 28 
Gender & soC’Y 32, 47–49 (2013). 
178 See infra note 183.




183 See, e.g., Federal court nixes taxpayer-funded sex change for wife killer, Fox news (Dec. 20, 2015), 
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/federal-court-nixes-taxpayer-funded-sex-change-for-wife-killer [https://
perma.cc/U55U-NWA8]; Martin Finucane et al., Federal appeals court upholds Mass. inmate’s right to 
taxpayer-funded sex change surgery, bos. Globe, (Jan. 17, 2014), https://www.boston.com/news/local-
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to lethal depravity.184 “Security,” in essence, is necropolitical code for keeping deviancy in 
check by condemning it to social exclusion and death. 
Bissonnette’s testimony concluded that, given the difficulties, the only possible hous-
ing for Kosilek would be in the “single cell segregation unit,” or solitary confinement.185 
The court writes that Bissonnette “expressed concern” that housing Kosilek in solitary con-
finement for the remainder of her life sentence would have a “negative impact” on her men-
tal health.186 Having exhausted the necropolitical reasons for denying Kosilek gender-af-
firming surgery, the court’s conclusion circles back to a biopolitical logic in which prison 
officials have a duty to provide medical care and rehabilitation for prisoners. The denial of 
news/2014/01/17/federal-appeals-court-upholds-mass-inmates-right-to-taxpayer-funded-sex-change-surgery 
[https://perma.cc/QJY4-BBBF] (“convicted wife killer Michelle L. Kosilek”); Candace Sutton, Male 
Criminals Who Become Women Behind Bars, adelaide now (Apr. 11, 2013), https://www.adelaidenow.
com.au/news/weird/call-me-michelle-the-killers-who-become-women-behind-bars/story-fngo0pax-
1226615750377?nk=47cca477826920d05e65dbcdd3ac9e63-1538509530 [https://perma.cc/RVM9-PCE9] 
(“US wife killer Robert ‘Michelle’ Kosilek”); Alyssa Newcomb, Transgender Inmate Michelle Kosilek 
Fighting for Electrolysis, abC news (Nov. 19, 2012), https://abcnews.go.com/US/transgender-inmate-
michelle-kosilek-fighting-electrolysis/story?id=17760411 [https://perma.cc/MY33-P2R6] (“A convicted 
wife-killer”); Rachel Quigley & Louise Boyle, Transsexual wife killer who was granted tax-payer funded 
sex change should be allowed expert opinion on electrolysis hair removal, judge rules, dailY mail (Oct. 25, 
2012) https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2223066/Transsexual-wife-killer-Robert-Kosilek-allowed-
expert-opinion-electrolysis-hair-removal.html [perma.cc/L8WU-QKZA]; Erica Ritz, Judge: Taxpayers Will 
Cover Convicted Wife-Killer’s Sex Change – and Maybe His [sic] $500K in Legal Fees, the blaZe (Sept. 
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17, 2012), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2204516/Robert-Kosilek-Transsexual-wife-killer-
granted-tax-payer-funded-sex-change-reimbursed-years-legal-fees.html [perma.cc/AD32-4FCN]; Wendy 
Kaminer, Is Denying Treatment to Transsexual Inmates ‘Cruel and Unusual’?, the atlantiC (Sept. 7, 2012), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/09/is-denying-treatment-to-transsexual-inmates-cruel-
and-unusual/262074/ [perma.cc/NB27-N5XT] (“Convicted wife killer Michelle (née Robert) Kosilek is 
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184 See JoeY l. moGul et al., queer (in)JustiCe: the CriminaliZation oF lGbt people in the united 
states (2011).
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SRS, of course, also negatively impacts Kosilek’s mental health. Necropolitics, however, 
does not allow a subject to choose how to die; it maintains the subjugated body in a state 
close to death, as literal death would snuff out the carceral power that is exercised over it. 
Thus, the carceral state would rather force Kosilek to live with its violent inscription of 
maleness on her body, than allow her to die as a woman inhabiting the body she desires.
IV. Resuscitating the Eighth Amendment: The Role of Courts and Advocates
The Kosilek litigation generated countless salacious media reports that fixated on nam-
ing Kosilek as a “transsexual” and a “wife-killer,”187 deploying archetypes of trans peo-
ple as deviant, pathological, and criminal.188 These reports cast criminal sexual deviancy 
against (cis)female victimhood in order to stoke public outrage. Additionally, the media 
and the courts spoke directly to one another. One reporter wrote of the “obvious distasteful-
ness of a wife killer angling to serve out his [sic] sentence of life without parole in a wom-
en’s prison.”189 This was quoted in Kosilek III in the First Circuit’s analysis of the influence 
of media opposition to Kosilek receiving SRS on the decisions of DOC officials. In Kosilek 
II, Judge Wolf quotes from a Boston Globe article that describes Kosilek as having made 
“a complete and utter fool out of an otherwise thoughtful and respected federal jurist, U.S. 
District Judge Mark L. Wolf.”190 More generally, the media represented the voice of a pub-
lic outraged at the notion of funding a “sex change operation” (elsewhere “sex surgery”) 
with “taxpayer dollars,” for a “convicted wife-killer.”191 There is a more than creeping mor-
alism that links the archetype of the gleeful queer (wife-)killer with the provocative and 
perversely imbued notion of “sex surgery” [sic], and with “taxpayer dollars” representing 
the normative citizenry with which Kosilek, as “the Other,” is contrasted. This embodies 
what Jasbir Puar has called “queer necropolitics,” a necropolitical trade-off that conditions 
the legal subjecthood normative, taxpaying queers on the exclusion of criminal, deviant 
queers. Against this backdrop of rank transphobia and heated debate, both courts and ad-
vocates have roles to play in countering the necropolitical and biopolitical logics that cut 
trans prisoners off from vital, gender-affirming care.
187 Id. at 755.
188 See generally moGul et al., queer (in)JustiCe, supra note 184.
189 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 225 (D. Mass. 2012) (citing Eileen McNamara, When Gender Isn’t 
Relevant, the boston Globe (June 11, 2016)). 
190 Id.
191 Kosilek III, 740 F.3d at 755.
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A. Resuscitating the Eighth Amendment 
Jon Wool argues that “restricting prison medical care litigation is bad correctional 
policy and bad public health policy” and calls on the judiciary to recognize the importance 
of their role in protecting prisoners’ rights: “Because the political process disfavors 
prisoners and the litigation that protects their rights . . . it is critical to have access to the 
courts to achieve what the majoritarian branches neglect.”192 The costs of providing even 
minimally adequate care are enormous, and legislators and political actors are unlikely 
to successfully allocate funds, as healthcare in prisons is not politically popular.193 In his 
opinion for Kosilek II, Judge Wolf takes great pains to remind both prison officials and the 
media that factors like Kosilek’s crime of conviction, no matter how unpleasant, and the 
nature of her “condition,” no matter how “rare,” have no bearing on prison officials’ duty 
to discharge their Eighth Amendment obligations. Nor can they take into account public 
censure or the costs of care, including the apparent injustice of a prisoner receiving state-
funded SRS when it is not even covered by most insurers.
One journalist opined: “If [Kosilek] is at risk of suicide, [Kosilek] should be placed 
under constant observation. But that’s sufficient.”194 This appears to be the ultimate position 
of the DOC, and the full First Circuit accepts it as within their administrative discretion. 
Yet this entirely misses the point of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Adequacy of care requires actual care; placing a prisoner on suicide watch may be adequate 
to prevent death, nevertheless it is not care in any meaningful sense. The Fourth Circuit 
recognized this point in De’lonta v. Johnson: “By analogy, imagine that prison officials 
prescribe a painkiller to an inmate who has suffered a serious injury from a fall, but that the 
inmate’s symptoms, despite the medication, persist to the point that he now, by all objective 
measure, requires evaluation for surgery. Would prison officials then be free to deny him 
consideration for surgery, immunized from constitutional suit by the fact they were giving 
him a painkiller? We think not.”195
In contrast to De’lonta, Kosilek IV appears to signal the triumph of the necropolitical 
192 Jon wool, Litigating for Better Medical Care, in publiC health behind bars: From prisons to 
Communities 25, 25 (Robert Greifinger ed., 2007).
193 Id. at 26.
194 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 225 (D. Mass. 2012) (citing Eileen McNamara, When Gender Isn’t 
Relevant, the bos. Globe (June 11, 2016)).
195 De’lonta v Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 526 (4th Cir. 2013).
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framework. Indeed, it sets an unfortunate precedent for ceding deference to prison officials’ 
assessment of the security concerns that emerge from providing SRS, even where those 
security concerns have been shown throughout the factual record to be rife with pretext, 
ambiguity, and animus. However, the judges in Kosilek were in fact closely divided on the 
two linked questions, representing the two prongs of Estelle: whether SRS was the only 
form of adequate care; and whether prison officials were justified in denying SRS for se-
curity reasons. Their disagreement resulted from an impasse between the biopolitical and 
necropolitical framings of the trans prisoner’s body––whether it presents a medical need 
or a security threat.
The Eighth Amendment is meant to be a judicial backstop against the state’s power 
to punish. While courts are justified in deferring to prison officials on matters of security, 
to accept the judgment of their nonmedical personnel as to what constitutes adequate or 
appropriate medical care is to abdicate judicial responsibility to enforce the Eighth Amend-
ment. Security considerations should not be allowed to permeate the adequacy of care 
analysis. Nor should courts uncritically accept, as prison officials may insist, the existence 
of an irreconcilable conflict in their duties.196 
Instead of sifting for evidence of prison officials’ “deliberate indifference,” a nearly 
oxymoronic term for an enormously high standard, courts should focus on assessing the 
plaintiff’s medical needs and the adequate care. Another factor that courts should consider 
in these cases is whether an agency has a history of denying certain kinds of care, or of 
denying care to certain groups of people. Ten years after Kosilek I, Judge Wolf remarked 
in Kosilek II that Eighth Amendment access-to-care suits brought by trans prisoners have 
“recently become more common in Massachusetts because the DOC has repeatedly denied 
transsexual prisoners prescribed treatment for reasons that the courts have found to be 
improper,” citing four different cases.197 These facts play no role in the Eighth Amendment 
analysis, because the “deliberate indifference” prong of Estelle is undertaken at the level 
of individual actors. But plaintiffs like Kosilek are not denied care by isolated individuals; 
they are denied care by the decision of the carceral institution. This institutional failing 
raises broader issues with sovereign immunity that are beyond the scope of this Article, 
but the current workaround that focuses on the subjective intent of particular individuals 
196 “[A] prison official, acting reasonably and in good faith, might perceive an irreconcilable conflict 
between his duty to protect safety and his duty to provide adequate medical care.” Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d 
156, 161 (D. Mass. 2002) (cited in Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 243 (D. Mass. 2012)).
197 See Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449 (1st Cir. 2011); Soneeya, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 243; Brugliera v. 
Comm’r of Mass. Dep’t of Corr. (D. Mass. Dec. 16, 2009); Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 196–97; Kosilek 
I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 156.
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is untenable. The result is that trans prisoners configured by a necropolitical framework 
experience harms that compound their marginalization and the cruelty of their punishment.
The trans prisoner has a right to be free from the cruel and unusual punishment of de-
nying medically necessary gender-affirming care, which, more fundamentally, denies their 
gender identity and expression. As civil rights attorney Moira Meltzer-Cohen put it, “The 
issue is not that being trans is a mental health risk or a condition, but that the lack of access 
to gender affirmation can give rise to mental health problems where none would otherwise 
exist.”198 Even worse, such mental health problems are often then used to discredit the trans 
person by portraying them as psychotic, antisocial, manipulative or delusional.199 
B. Beyond Transmedicalism
The 2002 opinion for Kosilek v. Maloney introduces gender identity disorder as “a 
rare, medically recognized, major mental illness” marked by the belief that one is “cruelly 
trapped” in the wrong body.200 Unfortunately, this definition suggests an understanding of 
trans identity that is wrong in almost every respect. After its publication of the DSM-5, the 
American Psychiatric Association further clarified its decision to retire the term “gender 
identity disorder”: “gender nonconformity is not in itself a mental disorder,” and that the 
“critical element of gender dysphoria is the presence of clinically significant distress asso-
ciated with the condition.”201 Although part of an explicit effort to move away from a med-
icalized understanding of trans identity, this new definition is still worded in a somewhat 
puzzling way, as it is unclear to what “the condition” refers. As Ulrica Engdahl explains, 
the “wrong body” narrative creates a false contrast between a “real” internal sense of gen-
der and a “wrong” external gender, which produces “a reified image of both body and self 
as static and separate entities and thereby correlat[es] an essentialism of genital materiality 
that disputes the realness of transgender experience.”202 Moreover, it is simply not nearly 
198 Aviva Stahl, Advocates Fight Texas Statute Delaying Transgender Prisoners’ Ability to Change Their 
Names, the appeal (Apr. 12, 2018), https://theappeal.org/advocates-fight-texas-statute-delaying-transgender-
prisoners-ability-to-change-their-names-3c01f242257a/ [https://perma.cc/8764-ASQ4]. 
199 See, e.g., Report or Affidavit of Cynthia S. Osborne, M.S.W., Kosilek v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 
00CV12455 (D. Mass. May 20, 2005), 2005 WL 6529976.
200 Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 158.
201 am. psYChiatriC ass’n, Gender dYsphoria (2013), https://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/
Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA_DSM-5-Gender-Dysphoria.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VYW-4KBD].
202 Ulrica Engdal, Wrong Body, 1 tsq: transGender studs. q. 267, 267 (2014).
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as rare to be trans as the court seems to think.203 
An effect of transmedicalism is that the kind of facts that courts have accepted as 
demonstrating serious medical need are often those that erase the agency of the trans plain-
tiff. In fact, this erasure of the trans person’s agency or ownership of her own transness 
has implicitly become a necessary component of their credibility. When courts apply the 
Estelle test they only scrutinize the agency and decision-making capacity of prison officials 
who withhold care.
Trans plaintiffs are presented as more credible and sympathetic the less agency they are 
ascribed. As seen in the media reporting around Kosilek, ascriptions of agency create sus-
picions that the plaintiff might be trying to obtain an unentitled benefit to satisfy delusions 
born from a mental disorder or a “lifestyle choice,” which is code for deviant sexuality. As 
Elias Vitulli has noted, courts cannot envision the trans subject as anything but robbed of 
autonomy and cornered by dysphoria into choosing treatment that is portrayed as ghast-
ly.204 Courts look to facts such as self-“mutilation,” self-castration, and suicide attempts to 
find evidence of genuine and serious medical need.205 In one case, a court delegitimized 
the trans plaintiff’s claim based on the fact that she exhibited no mental health problems or 
suicidal ideation, writing that “GID becomes a serious medical issue when the distress is 
intense enough to lead to self-injury.”206 That the plaintiff did not turn to self-injury meant 
to the court that she did not demonstrate a serious medical need.207 This is deeply problem-
atic on many levels and ultimately founded upon the mistaken, transmedicalist premise that 
experiencing distress is an essential part of being trans. 
This leads courts to only find rights for trans plaintiffs from a stance of totalizing pa-
ternalism. The courts’ narratives of trans plaintiffs erase the reality that trans people have 
always strategically employed the transmedicalist paradigm in order to obtain gender-af-
firming substances and procedures. Judge Wolf found an expert witness’s testimony that no 
203 See, e.g., Julia serano, whippinG Girl: a transsexual woman on sexism and the sCapeGoatinG oF 
FemininitY 139 (2007) (“The gatekeepers consistently claimed that transsexuality was a ‘rare’ phenomenon 
without acknowledging that they themselves played an active role in restricting the number of trans people 
who would be allowed to transition.”).
204 Elias Vitulli, Racialized Criminality and the Imprisoned Trans Body: Adjudicating Access to Gender-
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“heterosexual man [would] voluntarily give us his penis to get something like hormones” 
to be particularly persuasive.208 This crude formulation conflates gender and sexual orien-
tation, suggesting that Kosilek’s desire for SRS might be an elective sexual perversion. At 
the same time, it states the obvious. Kosilek is not a man (nor is she heterosexual), and she 
has represented this to the world throughout her life. Yet she still bore the burden of prov-
ing the validity of her identity in court through expert testimony. 
Why is Kosilek’s self-identification not evidence enough that she is a woman? Why is 
her stated desire for SRS not, in and of itself, the best evidence that she needs it? Through 
the contortions of transmedicalist logic, trans needs only emerge as valid when they do not 
converge with wants. The suspicion that Kosilek may be trying to “game the system” by 
threatening suicide suggests an underlying assumption that either a person might want SRS 
for some reason other than being trans, or that seeking SRS is in itself suspect. Advocates 
must challenge such cissexist assumptions and identify them as such. In a transmedicalist 
culture, Kosiek’s need for gender-affirming care is only valid or sympathetic when it is 
presented as emphatically not a want. But trans people want as much as they need gen-
der-affirming somatechnics, and it is the biopolitical policing of gender norms that twists 
their needs beyond comprehension. 
Gender-affirming somatechnics are material needs. They include not only “care” but 
also the provision, for instance, of undergarments and cosmetics. The deprivation of these 
needs can create debilitating mental health problems arising from gender dysphoria. Trans-
medicalism suggests that mental distress is innate to trans people, rather than as a response 
to social and material conditions.209 Furthermore, the analogy between transness and a 
medical condition is limited. Whereas a physician is usually the best witness to testify as 
to the details of an illness, a trans person is always the best witness of their own gender. 
The current jurisprudence often conflates gender dysphoria and trans identity with mental 
illness, which defendants conveniently use to discredit trans prisoners. Advocates must 
beware of setting precedents that reinforce erroneous assumptions about transness. 
V. Cruel and Usual
Michelle Kosilek won recognition by two courts of her right to receive gender-affirm-
208 Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 165 (D. Mass. 2002).
209 See am. psYChiatriC ass’n, Gender dYsphoria (2013), https://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/
Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA_DSM-5-Gender-Dysphoria.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VYW-4KBD].
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ing genital surgery.210 At least seven experts who evaluated her recommended SRS; at least 
five testified at trial that it was the only form of adequate medical care for her.211 Why, 
then, did she ultimately not prevail? The factual record is rife with evidence of deliberate 
indifference. Commissioner Dennehy made it clear that she does not care if a trans woman 
lives or dies.212 
The key question of law in Kosilek was whether prison officials were deliberately indif-
ferent to her medical needs. Yet the opinions reveal a judicial discourse that fixated on two 
representations of her transfeminine body. The defendants argued that altering a prisoner’s 
genitals would create insurmountable “security concerns,” safety risks, and administration 
difficulties. Kosilek’s advocates emphasized that she was at risk of suicide if she could not 
receive SRS, thus presenting a serious medical need. The defendants then countered that 
there is no Eighth Amendment entitlement to the specific care of a plaintiff’s choice, and 
that hormone therapy should be sufficient for Kosilek. Finally, they argued, suicidality can 
be managed with carceral technologies, such as solitary confinement or increased surveil-
lance. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ultimately found this argument persuasive. 
Courts must move away from transmedicalism, guided by advocates who center the 
voices of trans people rather than those of psychiatrists. This means reframing the current 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to recognise that trans prisoners’ medical needs arise 
from the denial of gender affirmation, rather than from being trans. As Kosilek demonstrat-
ed, transmedicalism is useless when trans lives are not valued. The number of experts who 
argued that SRS was medically necessary did not ultimately matter to the First Circuit. The 
court ultimately accepted, at least as plausible, the DOC’s assertions that a trans woman 
in her sixties could seriously threaten order in the carceral institution by having genital 
surgery. When trans people are discursively reduced to mere bodies, whether as dependent 
recipients of care or as security risks, prison officials can present the trade-off as a reason-
able dilemma. 
The Supreme Court stated in Brown v. Plata (2011) that “[a] prison’s failure to pro-
vide sustenance for inmates may actually produce physical torture or a lingering death.”213 
210 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Mass. 2012); Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek III), 740 F.3d 733, 736 
(1st Cir. 2014).
211 Kosilek III, 740 F.3d at 225–27; Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 234 (including Dr. Forstein, Dr. Seil, Dr. 
Kaufman, Dr. Kapila of the Fenway Clinic, Dr. Brown, Dr. Applebaum, and Dr. Levin). 
212 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 201.
213 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011). 
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There are many forms of cruelty; the denial of one’s gender identity and expression is one 
that courts have yet to recognize. Perhaps it would require confronting the difficult reality 
that the mistreatment of trans prisoners is pervasive and severe, and that prisons may never 
not be an essentially violent space. Nevertheless, as long as there are trans people in prison, 
it remains the duty of courts to protect their Eighth Amendment rights. In educating fact-
finders about the harm of denying gender-affirming care, advocates must uplift and center 
trans people’s own narratives of gender and their experiences of incarceration. To do so is 
merely to respect the fundamental dignity, autonomy, and humanity of trans people.
